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Abstract. We investigate the role of information on consumers’ valuation for food 
products  containing  genetically  modified  organisms  (GMOs),  using  data  from  a 
specifically  designed  survey.  We  provide  three  main  results.  First,  we  show  that 
introducing  mandatory  labels  to  identify  whether  or  not  a  food  product  contains 
GMOs,  significantly  reduces  consumers’  valuation.  Second,  adding  to  the  label 
additional information on GMOs significantly affects valuation. Third, no matter the 
sign  of  the  information  previously  received,  consumers  are  more  willing  to  trust 
General Practitioners (GPs), the information source they prefer most. Overall, these 
results indicate that the crucial issue is not the presence of the label per se, but the 
availability of the necessary information to make good use of the label content to 
assess  potential  health  risks  deriving  from  GM  foods.  In  particular,  our  findings 
suggest that this can be achieved by properly informing (and convincing) GPs and 
other health professionals that risks for human health are minimal. 
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1. Introduction 
Surveys designed to measure confidence in food products reveal that a significant 
fraction of European consumers believes that several aspects of foods (taste, farming 
methods, nutritional content, and – most importantly - safety) have indeed deteriorated 
in recent decades (e.g., Poppe and Kjærnes, 2003). Besides a clear role played by 
producers, also Public Authorities are held responsible for this trend. According to a 
Special Eurobarometer Issue, 47% of the EU citizens think that Public Authorities 
attach a higher importance to economic goals than to their well-being. The other side 
of the coin is that 42% of EU citizens consider it likely that the food they eat is risky 
for their health (European Commission, 2006): 50% of EU citizens would indeed like 
more information on the safety of food products (European Commission, 2008). 
A particularly relevant and critical issue for public health emerges when modern 
biotechnology,  and  its  impact  on  food  safety,  is  considered.  As  it  is  well-known, 
biotechnology  gives  producers  the  possibility  of  modifying  the  genetic  material  of 
organisms to confer to products (mainly food and feed) some desirable characteristics 
(such  as,  for  instance,  resistance  to  insects,  which  should  reduce  the  need  for 
pesticides). Not surprisingly, as far as genetic manipulation is concerned, 25% of EU 
citizens declare to be “very worried” and 37% to be “fairly worried”; overall, 62% of 
EU citizens fell uneasy with genetically modified organisms (European Commission, 
2006). However, about half of the European consumers would buy GM foods if it were 
proved  they  are  healthier  or  more  environmental  friendly  (European  Commission, 
2008).   3 
Taking this situation as simply the result of some “green lobbies” successfully 
campaigning to influence public opinion and preferences is reasonably too simplistic. 
Consumers’ diffidence is more likely to be rooted in a genuine uncertainty about the 
consequences upon both their health and the natural environment deriving from the 
production  and  consumption  of  food  products  containing  genetically  modified 
organisms, or GMOs (e.g., Nestle, 2003). 
But how public opinion is influenced, and by whom? In this work we offer some 
evidence  to  provide  an  answer  to  these  questions  by  investigating  the  role  of 
information on consumers’ valuation for food products containing GMOs, using data 
from a specifically designed survey involving a sample of undergraduate students at 
the Faculty of Economics of the University of Turin. Our aim is to study individuals’ 
valuation for a specific product (which can possess either genetically modified content 
or not) as long as the nature and the source of the available information changes. 
Confirming previous studies, our findings indicate that the genetically modified 
content  of  foods  significantly  alter  consumers’  valuation.  Moreover,  we  also  find 
evidence – consistent with European surveys (e.g., European Commission, 2006) - that 
individuals  choose  (and  give  sensibly  more  value  to)  the  information  received  by 
General Practitioners (GPs). This suggests that consumers are basically interested to 
the consequences upon their health of the production and consumption of genetically 
modified  foods.  In  this  respect,  the  information  received  by  GPs  is  exactly  the 
information which is required to assess these consequences. In particular, when asked 
to  choose  among  different  sources  (including  “green  lobbies”  or  business-oriented   4 
newspapers),  they  prefer  the  information  received  within  a  long-term  relationship 
characterized by personalized trust, revealing that they perceive this information as the 
most  reliable  and  unbiased.
1  Hence,  consumers’  diffidence  in  GM  foods  probably 
reflects  the  uncertainty  in  the  medical  profession  regarding  GMOs  and  their 
consequences for public health and the environment. 
Even if our sample is not obviously representative of the whole Italian population, 
still our results deserve attention from a policy perspective, in that they emphasize two 
important facts often neglected by Public Authorities. The first of such facts is that 
health  is  the  primary  concern  for  consumers;  the  second  is  that  to  be  effective, 
information  about  biotechnology  should  be  given  taking  into  account  consumers’ 
confidence that their health concerns are properly accounted for. In terms of policies, at 
least  two  suggestions  stem  from  here.  First,  since  identifying  food  as  having 
genetically modified content reduces ipso facto individuals’ valuation, it is likely that 
the  biotech  industry  and  the  green  lobby  groups  will  keep  on  wrestling  about  the 
contentious issue of whether mandatory labeling should be enforced or not. It seems 
clear that as far as European consumers will perceive a potential danger to their health 
related to the use of GMOs, the biotech industry has a reasonable interest in contrasting 
                                                 
1 On trust in GPs see, e.g., Pearson and Raeke (2000) and Tarrant et al. (2003). A recent 
anecdotal example of this confidence in GPs is offered by the H1N1 vaccine. During the 2009-
2010 pandemic, most of the European population refused to take the vaccine, despite this was 
strongly  recommended by  the  experts  appointed  by  the World  Health  Organization  (whose 
recommendations  for  the  pandemic  period    are  available  on-line  at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/en/index.html). It was generally preferred to follow the 
suggestions not to take the vaccine coming from (most of the) GPs. It is noteworthy that in a 
well-known speech delivered to the Polish Parliament (on November 5, 2009), Poland's Health 
Minister Eva Kopacz, a former medical doctor who practised as a GP for many years before 
becoming Health Minister, argued against the H1N1 vaccine.   5 
labeling. But denying labeling can be seen as in contrast with the article 153 of the EC 
Treaty, which affirms that: “in order to promote the interests of consumers and to 
ensure  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection,  the  Community  shall  contribute  to 
protecting  the  health,  safety  and  economic  interests  of  consumers,  as  well  as  to 
promoting their right to information, education and to organize themselves in order to 
safeguard  their  interests”  (emphasis  added).  Second,  while  it  is  obvious  that 
information about GMOs is valuable to consumers, not all the information received by 
consumers can modify their beliefs towards biotechnology. It is extremely important 
that the information source is perceived as unbiased, i.e., it is crucial that whoever 
provides information is perceived as having no interest at stake. This means that GPs 
(or other health professional) can be empowered to provide a fair view of the current 
state of knowledge about GM foods, e.g., making available to their patients updated 
scientific information as soon as it becomes available. But this also means that health 
professionals  need  to  be  properly  informed  (and  convinced)  themselves  about  the 
effects on health deriving from both the production and consumption of GM foods. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some previous 
results  concerning  consumers’  attitude  towards GMOs  in  the  presence  of  different 
information sources.  In  Section  3  we  describe  the survey.  Section  4 illustrates  the 
results. Section 5 provides some discussion and concludes. 
 
 
   6 
2. Health at risk: Consumers’ valuation and information about 
food characteristics 
 
Since the XIX century two forces have reshaped the food production industry. On 
the  one  hand,  technological  advancements  have  made  small  scale  productions 
economically inefficient and have allowed for long term food conservation (through 
refrigeration, packaging, and the use of chemical preservatives); on the other hand, 
improvements  in  both  information  transmission  and  transportation  of  goods  have 
lowered  the  costs  of  separating  consumers  from  producers,  thus  sharpening 
information asymmetries (e.g. Beraldo and Turati, 2011). The result of these processes 
has been a greater difficulty for consumers to assess food characteristics, which in turn 
has stimulated food adulteration with increasing health risks (e.g., Alsberg, 1931). The 
reaction  of  Public  Authorities  has  traditionally  been  that  of  enforcing  a  stricter 
regulation  for  the  production  and  marketability  of  food  products.  Nowadays,  State 
regulation has however lost a large part of its power. The most obvious reason (but not 
the only one, as remarked below) is that a global economy would require global level 
regulation, something clearly difficult to achieve. 
In such a situation, it is therefore not surprising that new information provided to 
consumers is able to substantially affect their valuation, especially when it concerns 
technologies  surrounded  by  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  in  terms  of  health  risks. 
Indeed, a first well-established result in the literature is that positive (resp. negative) 
information about food production/processing technologies increases (resp. decreases)   7 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a particular good in lab experiments designed to catch 
individuals’  market  preferences.  For  instance,  Fox  et  al.  (2002),  who  examine  the 
effects  of  alternative  descriptions  of  “food  irradiation”  on  the  WTP  for  a  pork 
sandwich irradiated to control Trichinella by considering a sample of 87 primary food 
shoppers, find that whilst a “favorable” description of irradiation increases WTP, an 
“unfavorable” description decreases it
2. However, when both the pro- and the anti-
irradiation descriptions are provided, the negative description dominates, and WTP 
decreases. This result remains true even if either the negative information is identified 
as coming from a lobby group (e.g., a consumer advocacy group), or the information 
itself  is  provided  in  a  clearly  non-scientific  way.  A  possible  explanation  for  this 
outcome can be offered by (some version) of the Prospect Theory, which provides a 
sensible account of why individuals tend to give more value to negative information 
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
These findings have been confirmed for the case of GM foods by Rousu et al. 
(2007). Their study analyses the behaviour of 172 individuals auctioning upon three 
items  in  the  presence  of  information  reflecting  different  perspectives:  the  biotech 
industry  perspective,  the  environmental  groups  perspective,  and  a  third  party 
perspective characterized by having no interest at stake. Their findings are consistent 
with some of the results provided in our paper: first, bidders sensibly reduce their 
willingness to pay for a food item even if no other information, except the genetically 
                                                 
2 Trichinella is a harmful parasite which causes severe infections (Trichinellosis). As recalled 
by, e.g., Nestle (2003), irradiation is a technique used to kill pathogens and other unwanted 
microbes  using  cobalt-60  and  cesium-137  (i.e.,  radiation)  to  bombard  foods,  which  –  not 
surprisingly - induces dread and outrage; more importantly it cannot guarantee sterility.   8 
modified content, is provided; second, bidders who receive only the biotech industry 
perspective are willing to pay a premium for GM food; finally, negative information 
has an higher impact than positive information on consumers’ WTP for genetically 
modified foods. 
If the “sign” of new information is important in affecting consumers’ valuation, it 
is also natural to expect that the credibility of the information source significantly 
affects individuals’ reactions. According to Frewer et al. (1998), credibility is however 
strongly influenced by individuals’ prior attitudes: individuals who hold extreme views 
might choose not to trust an information source rather than change their attitudes. Lusk 
et al. (2004) also find that initial attitudes have a significant effect on how individuals 
respond to new information.  
Focusing  on  modern  biotechnology,  the  issue  of  what  information  source 
individuals have more confidence in to tell the truth is tackled by Bucchi and Neresini 
(2004) in a two-wave survey (a representative sample of 1,022 Italian citizens aged 
over 18 responded to a phone survey in September 2000; another representative sample 
of  1,017  citizens  were  interviewed  in  November  2001).  Their  results  confirm  that 
individuals have more confidence in an information source when they perceive that the 
information  it  offers  is  not  strategically  provided:  over  one  third  of  the  sampled 
individuals declare to trust universities and scientists (36%); consumer organizations 
(28%), environmental organizations (18%), Public Authorities (6%) and industry and 
entrepreneurs (2%) follow. There is one aspect of this study which is worth being 
emphasized:  as  far  as  modern  biotechnology  is  concerned,  the  percentage  of   9 
individuals  who  trust  Public Authorities is  very  low,  a  finding  consistent  with  the 
results  provided  by  the  studies  commissioned  by  the  European  Authorities  (e.g., 
European  Commission,  2006).  A  possible  explanation  is  that  European  consumers 
believe that the biotech industry is highly capable at influencing public regulation. 
A related question is whether the aversion that consumers display in surveys about 
GM foods really reflects their actual market behaviour. For example, Noussair et al. 
(2004) find that in laboratory experiments an high percentage of consumers (42%) is 
willing to purchase GM foods provided it is sufficiently inexpensive. This is in line 
with the recent findings by Aoki et al. (2010), whose study investigates consumers’ 
reaction to a food additive (sodium nitrite) present in ham sandwiches in both real and 
hypothetical  situations.  Consumers’  WTP  (valuation)  for  ham  sandwiches  without 
sodium nitrite are estimated to be lower in the experiment and higher in the survey, 
after  negative  and  positive  information  is  provided,  implying  that  the  effect  of 
information differs: the information related to flavour seems to have more influence on 
the consumers’ choice behaviour in a real situation, while the information associated 
with  health  risk  plays  a  relatively  more  important  role  in  a hypothetical  situation. 
Overall, lab experiments seem then to catch some aspects of individuals’ preferences 
which differ from those aspects caught in surveys. In particular, differently from lab 
experiments, individuals involved in surveys  may be induced to see themselves as 
placed in the role of citizens rather than in that of consumers, and may therefore be 
stimulated to make judgments from the society’s point of view (e.g., Noussair et al., 
2004). This seems especially true whenever individuals are confronted with ethically   10 
difficult issues (Nyborg, 2000). As the central question in the European debate about 
GMOs concerns the role of information in conditioning the support of citizens/voters 
to policies favoring the production and consumption of GM foods, we consider here 
survey analysis as the most valuable tool to elicit (social) preferences. 
 
3. The survey 
 
3.1. Design and Procedure 
The survey on which this study is based was conducted at the University of Turin, 
Faculty of Economics, on November 18
th, 2009. 108 undergraduate students, randomly 
recruited, were involved. After taking a seat, participants were asked to both switch off 
their  mobiles  and  stop  talking  to  their  colleagues.  Since  the  beginning  they  were 
informed  that  the  survey  consisted  of  different  stages  and  that  they  would  have 
received the instructions – read loudly by a tutor – stage by stage.
3 In each stage, a 
tutor  delivered  to  any  participant  a  paper  displaying:  1)  the  picture  of  a  one  liter 
unbranded orange juice box
4; 2) the basic information about the product  (net weight 
and  content);  3)  some  stage-dependent  information  about  the  product.  The  task 
subjects had to perform in each stage was to state their valuation of the product and to 
report  it  on  an  anonymous  card.  Subjects  were  informed  that,  in  each stage,  their 
                                                 
3 We used what experimentalists call a within-subject design in order to observe if and how 
consumers’ choices may change across the treatments as new information becomes available. 
4 The picture was slightly manipulated in order to get rid of the brand and to avoid noise in the 
data due to subjects’ opinion on that particular brand.   11 
valuation could not have exceeded their endowment, set to 5 euro
5. At the end of each 
stage, subjects’ valuation was collected.  
The survey consisted of four stages. In stage 1 (S1), subjects were provided only 
with some basic information about the product. In particular, participants received a 
card with the picture of the product and a label with some basic information (Fig. B1). 
In stage 2 (S2), they were notified that the orange juice contained GMOs by adding a 
specific information to the label (Fig. B2). In the third stage (S3), the sample was 
randomly divided into two groups (A and B), and newscast information was provided. 
In particular, group A got pro-GMOs information; group B anti-GMOs information 
(Fig. B3 and B4). Finally, in the fourth stage (S4), subjects were allowed to select the 
sender of some additional information choosing among four alternatives (Fig. B5): a 
GP; a green lobby group (Greenpeace); a business-oriented newspaper (Il Sole24Ore, 
the Italian daily reflecting the views of the business association Confindustria); and the 
scientists.  
In  order  to  check  whether  choices  were  affected  by  socio-demographic 
characteristics,  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  stage  subjects  were  asked  to  fill  up  a 
questionnaire (Appendix C). When all the students handed in the questionnaire the 




                                                 
5 This restriction was introduced to avoid careless answers.   12 
3.2. Data description 
108  undergraduate students  of  the  University  of Turin,  Faculty  of  Economics, 
participated  in  the  survey.  A  summary  of  participants’  socio-demographic 
characteristics is presented in Appendix D Table 1.
 6 About 49% are male. The mean 
age of the participant is 22.8. 58% of the subjects interviewed declare to regularly 
consume orange juice. 39% control the label when buying products and all but one 
knew what GM foods are. Since only 20 participants declare whether they are in favour 
or against GMOs (with 17 out of 20 that were against biotech food), more than 80% of 
the sampled individuals do not seem to have any particular opinion about GMOs. This 
is a particularly favourable condition, as one of the aim of the survey was precisely that 




Data accruing from the survey show that - although only 17 participants declared 
to be against biotech food - a considerable reduction in average valuation is observed 
as soon as the genetically modified content of the product is displayed. This happens 
before  any  additional  information  about  GMOs  is  provided  by  the  researchers.  In 
particular, while subjects’ average valuation in S2 is 0.78, average valuation in S1 is 
1.46. The difference is statistically significant (paired t-test, t = 10.64, p = 0.000). 
Hence: 
                                                 
6 Socio-demographic data are available only for 105 of them.   13 
 
Result 1. When subjects are informed about the genetically modified content of the 
product, their valuation decreases. 
 
This result is in line with findings by Rousu et al. (2007). A possible explanation 
relies  on  the  risk  averse  behaviour  adopted  by  consumers  in  an  environment 
characterized  by  scarce  information  and  uncertainty  about  the  consequences  upon 
health  of  consuming  GM  foods.  Notice  that  controlling  for  socio-demographic 
characteristics (see Appendix D, Table 2) it turns out that individuals who usually 
scrutinize the label to inspect the characteristics of the product, display a significantly 
lower valuation in S2 with respect to S1 (0.65 vs 0.86; Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.849, 
p = 0.064), a result in line with the findings by Bucchi and Neresini (2002). This point 
is indeed relevant. As introducing mandatory labels to identify whether or not a food 
product contains GMOs significantly reduces consumers’ valuation, introducing such 
labelling without first winning consumers’ diffidence due to uncertainty and scarce 
information, may produce severe market failures. Potentially worthwhile exchanges 
could not be carried out due to lack of information about the consequences arising 
from consuming the product. 
In  S3  subjects  are  provided  new  additional  information.  Participants  were 
randomly selected into two groups (A and B) and newscast information was offered in 
addition to the label where the genetically modified nature of the product is signalled. 
Group  A  got  pro-GMOs  information;  group  B  got  anti-GMOs  information.  62   14 
participants were informed about the positive contribution of genetically modified food 
to reduce world hunger (INFO1_POS), while 46 subjects were told that GM foods 
increase allergies (INFO1_NEG). Notice that both information have been proposed as 
arguments pro- or against-GMOs in public debates (e.g., Nestle, 2003). This additional 
information has a significant effect on individuals’ valuation, even if the size of such 
an  effect  varies  according  to  the  type  of  information  received  (either  positive  or 
negative). In particular we find that: 
 
Result 2. Positive (negative) information about GMOs  positively (negatively) affects 
subjects’ valuation. The impact of the negative information on subjects’ valuation is 
higher than the impact of positive information. 
 
Analysing subjects’ valuation (see Appendix D Table 3), it turns out that in S3 the 
average  valuation  is  higher  than  in  S2  for  those  individuals  who  receive  positive 
information (0.98 in S3 vs 0.73 in S2; Wilcoxon test, z = 4.67, p = 0.000; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, D = 1.5, p = 0.000), whereas it is lower for those who receive negative 
information  (0.40  in  S3  vs  0.83  in  S2;  Wilcoxon  test,  z  =  -5.588,  p  =  0.000; 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test,  D  =  3.0217,  p  =  0.000).  On  average,  individuals  who 
receive positive information increase their valuation by 34%, whereas individuals who 
receive negative information decrease their valuation by 51%.  It is worth noticing that 
whereas the positive information was related to the contribution given by GMOs to   15 
preserve the environment, the negative information was related to the risks they imply 
for consumers’ health. 
This reduction in the stated valuation, consistent with the findings both by Fox et 
al. (2002) and Rousu et al. (2007), is robust to some key controls
7. First, we check 
whether differences in average valuation between the two groups is due to a sample 
selection  bias  rather  than  to  the  nature  of  the  information  received.  We  therefore 
compare  the  two  groups’  valuation  in  S2:  a  Mann-Whitney  test  confirms  that  no 
sample  bias  has  occurred  (z  =  -0.577,  p  =  0.564).  Second,  we  control  for  socio-
demographic  characteristics.  The  only  significant  difference  is  registered  when 
considering students’ gender. In particular, females’ reaction to negative information is 
slightly smaller than males; furthermore, females show a stronger reaction to positive 
information (Mann-Whitney  test, z = 2.475, p = 0.013). More details are given in 
Appendix D Table 4. The econometric analysis confirms the statistical significance of 
these results (see Appendix E, R1). Considering the difference in the average valuation 
of the i-th individual between S3 and S2 as the dependent variable of a multivariate 
model,  both  the  coefficients  associated  with  the  variables  INFO1_NEG  and 
INFO1_POS,  which  record  the  type  (whether  negative  or  positive)  of  information 
given to each individual, display the expected sign (negative and positive respectively) 
and are statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. The effect persists across 
specifications and is robust to the addition of controls (only in the third specification 
                                                 
7  Recent analyses  based on field data  (e.g.,  De Paola  and  Scoppa,  2010)  similarly  show  a 
sensible effect on consumers’ demand for a particular brand whenever negative information 
concerning that brand is provided.   16 
the variable INFO1_POS keeps the expected sign but becomes insignificant). Notice 
that  the  difference  in  average  valuation  between  S3  and  S2  is  less  responsive  to 
positive  information  if  the  subject  is  male  (this  effect  is  caught  by  the  variable 
INFO1_POSi*male in R1 Appendix E, whose coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant). 
In S4 the scenario is more complex. Subjects are given the opportunity to ask for 
additional information. Each participant can choose among different sources – GPs 
(DOC),  a  green  lobby  group  (GREEN),  scientists  (SC),  and  a  business  oriented 
newspaper  (NEWS).  This  implies  that  it  is  possible  to  identify  eight  groups  – 
INFO1_NEG_DOC (N = 28), INFO1_NEG_GREEN (N = 5),  INFO1_NEG_SC (N = 
10),  INFO1_NEG_NEWS  (N  =  3),  INFO1_POS_DOC  (N  =  25), 
INFO1_POS_GREEN (N = 11), INFO1_POS_SC (N = 20), INFO1_POS_NEWS (N = 
6). Each of these groups consists of individuals who have received in S3 either positive 
or negative information on GMOs, and then choose in S4 one of the four information 
sources given the information received in S3. Before moving further, it is important to 
note that the sign of the new information was not revealed in advance to participants, 
but only publicized after their choice. This means that the choice was only conditional 
on information received in S3, and on the trust each participant hold in these different 
information sources. Two issues are then relevant here: a) what source is considered 
the most reliable; b) what is the impact of the new information given the messages 
previously received.   17 
As for the first issue, Table 5 (Appendix D) reports the distribution of choices in 
S4. About 50% of the subjects choose to get further information from GPs, no matter 
the type of information received in S3; scientists (28%) follow. This result is more 
striking  when  gender  is  considered.  Nearly  70%  of  females  –  the  gender  more 
concerned with health risk issues - choose GPs as the preferred information source, a 
result probably reflecting gender differences in risk taking behaviour, which has been 
observed both in lab settings and in the field (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In 
particular, according to the literature, women are found to be more risk averse than 
men, either because of differences in emotional reactions to risky situations, or because 
they  interpret  risky  situations  as  threats  which  should  be  avoided.  This  latter 
interpretation fits well in the case of GMOs. 
For what concerns the second issue, it is worth noticing that information given by 
GPs (negative in our survey) significantly affects valuation (see Appendix D Table 6). 
The Wilcoxon test shows that the reduction in valuation between S4 and S3 emerging 
as soon as individuals are exposed to the information coming from GPs, is statistically 
significant. Notice that neither positive (NEWS) nor neutral (SC) messages seem to 
affect individuals’ valuation. This result is summarized as follows: 
 
Result 3. Individuals trust GPs most as a source of information on food safety. When – 
as  in  our  case  –  GPs  provide  a  negative  information  about  GMOs,  this  message 
reduces valuation, no matter the sign of the information previously received. 
   18 
The above findings are confirmed also by the econometric analysis. In particular, 
considering  a  simple  probit  model  (Table  R2  in  Appendix  E),  the  probability  of 
choosing in S4 one of the most popular information sources (i.e., DOC or SC) does not 
depend on the type of information previously received, as the coefficients on variables 
INFO1_NEG and INFO1_POS are both statistically insignificant. The only variable 
which has a statistically significant effect on the probability of choosing one of the 
above mentioned information sources is related to gender. As discussed above, this is 
probably reflecting gender differences in risk taking behaviour. 
 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
According  to  a  view  which  can  be  traced  back  to Adam  Smith’s  Lectures  on 
Juresprudence  (1763  [1978]),  markets  can  enforce  trustworthiness,  as  those  sellers 
which offer low quality products are punished with ostracism. This view is based on 
the assumption that consumers are always able to find out the quality of the goods 
which  are  being  provided,  either  by immediate  inspection  (search  goods),  or after 
consumption (experience goods). It is clear that if this were the case, the scope for 
public regulation would be very limited. It should be primarily aimed at ensuring that 
producers’ behaviour would not limit the working of market forces. However, the need 
for public regulation has increased significantly over the last two centuries along with 
the dramatic development of new technologies, which have endowed producers with   19 
the chance of marketing goods whose quality cannot be ascertained neither before nor 
after consumption (trust goods). 
This  asymmetric  information  problem  is  particularly  striking  also  for  food 
products, and even more so for those food products containing genetically modified 
organisms. Let us first assume that GM foods are substantially identical to other food 
products from the point of view of safety and health risks, and that the only problem 
from the societal point of view is to avoid adulteration that cannot be ascertained by 
consumers. The standard answer by policy makers to protect consumers has been the 
creation  of  independent  agencies  (e.g.,  Beraldo  and  Turati,  2011).  But  the  actual 
concern is that the agencies which were created to protect consumers - such as for 
instance the Food and Drug Administration in the US (FDA, created in 1906), or the 
recent  European  Food  Safety  Authority  (EFSA,  created  by  European  regulation 
178/2002) - are less and less able to properly do their job for several reasons (e.g., 
Nestle,  2003). First,  because the number  of  producers to  be  controlled  has  greatly 
increased, while the budget of government agencies has been reduced, not only relative 
to the need of additional controls
8. Second, because agencies are called to regulate food 
producers which have become more and more powerful, and can exercise inexorable 
pressures  on  governments  to  obtain  more  favourable  decisions.  Third,  because 
responsibility of controls has been allocated to a number of bureaucracies, that in order 
                                                 
8 As it was recognized in a recent editorial published by Nature, the FDA has never before had 
so many demands placed on it, nor has its budget ever been so constrained relative to its duties: 
“Between 2001 and 2007, for example, the number of US food-manufacturing plants under the 
FDA’s jurisdiction increased from about 51,000 to more than 65,000, yet the number of staff in 
its foods programme fell from 3,167 to 2,757. At current inspection rates, any given domestic 
food company faces a less than one-in-four chance of being inspected once in seven years” 
(Getting what you pay for, Nature, 462, 26 November 2009, p. 390).   20 
to supply an effective action and really guarantee food safety need to coordinate their 
activities
9. Given these difficulties, reputational mechanisms seem to have substituted 
in recent decades more traditional public controls. In other words, consumers solve the 
asymmetric information problem involved in buying credence foods by relying on the 
reputation of producers. 
However, reputation cannot work  for new technologies, and the idea that GM 
foods are identical to traditional foods from the point of view of health risks is not 
easily  accepted  by  consumers,  who  question  whether  or  not  GM  foods  should  be 
marketed at all given the uncertainty in terms of scientific evidence supporting the 
absence of any risks for human health. This view is based on at least three different 
unsolved issues. First, there is uncertainty on the long-term consequences to health 
following GM foods intake. For instance, as documented, e.g., in a recent paper by 
Tudisco et al. (2010), there is evidence of small genetically modified DNA fragments 
in  milk  (but  also  in  kids  organs)  when  mothers  are  fed  with  genetically  modified 
soybean. An increase in cell metabolism is also observed; but there is no evidence to 
show what are the risks for consumers’ health following this increase in metabolism. A 
second issue is related to the allergenic potential of GM foods. If the DNA for a new 
gene is introduced into a food, that food will also develop a new protein, which can 
cause allergic (unknown) reactions to some people. And the allergenic potential of 
most  GM  foods  is  both  unpredictable  and  not  easily  testable  (e.g.,  Nestle,  2003; 
Woolhiser and Metcalfe, 2003; EFSA, 2010). A third issue concerns the impact of GM 
                                                 
9 As for US, if we take food security in a broader sense, Nestle (2003) estimates that about four-
dozen federal bureaucracies are involved in protecting food against terrorists attacks.   21 
foods on antibiotic resistance. In particular, considering plant biotechnology, many fear 
that  the  use  of  antibiotic  resistance  marker  genes  in  GM  plants  can  contribute  to 
increase bacterial resistance, aggravating the problem for public health. Also in this 
case, conclusions from expert panels go in the direction of uncertain and unpredictable 
effects (e.g., EFSA, 2009). 
The ambiguities on the risks for human health do not shadow the ambiguities on 
the risks for the environment (and, indirectly, on human health). From this point of 
view, a first unsettled dispute is about the possibility that characteristics of GMOs can 
be transmitted to non-GMOs. For instance, transgenic oilseed canola plants have been 
found to pass on herbicide resistance to related weeds. As these reproduce at a highest 
pace  than  crops,  there  is  fear  that  cross-pollination  will  create  varieties  of  super-
resistant  weeds  that  could  displace  traditional  crops  and  result  in  an  ecological 
catastrophe (e.g., Nestle, 2003). A second issue is related to the risks for biodiversity, 
and – in particular – for beneficial insects, when exposed to GM plants. The most 
striking example on this matter is the debate developed around the case of monarch 
butterflies and the Bt corn starting from the contribution by Losey et al. (1999). As the 
authors argue, the genetically modified corn takes advantage from a toxin, which has 
been however proved to be harmful not only for a pest causing severe damages to 
crops, but also for insects like the monarch butterflies. These findings were highly 
criticised by Sears et al. (2001), who concluded that the impact on monarch butterfly 
population of Bt corn is negligible. As before, these wide differences in opinions by 
highly reputed scholars can only result in an increased uncertainty surrounding GMOs.   22 
Traditionally,  when  the  consequences  of  consuming  a  particular  good  are 
uncertain, there are two competing visions of public regulation. The “paternalistic” 
vision  dictates  that  -  given  the  lack  of  reliable  information  and  a  likely  myopic 
assessment of the health risk by consumers - governments should be called to make a 
final decision about the opportunity of marketing the product. A competing vision - 
rooted in the liberal principle that anyone is the best judge of his or her own interest - 
claims  that  governments  should  only  favour  both  the  dissemination  of  valuable 
information  and  an  acceptable  level  of  competition  among  producers,  leaving 
consumers free of making the choices which suit them best. It is commonly argued that 
the  first  vision  has  basically  characterized  the  European  policy  towards  GMOs, 
whereas the second would fit better the direction undertaken by U.S. In any case, both 
visions would reflect citizens’ (voters’) attitudes towards GM foods, rooted in cultural 
sensitivities, trust in regulation and quality of the available information (Gaskell et al., 
1999). 
The above mentioned distinction is however less precise than what is commonly 
understood. For example, one can interpret the U.S. policy of not requiring labelling 
food with genetically modified content as paternalistic as well, for it presupposes that 
there is no need to inform consumers to allow them to make the right choice given 
their beliefs. The government has already made it for all consumers in order to avoid 
confusion
10. Indeed, the favour accorded by consumers to biotechnology may in many 
                                                 
10  On  this point  see,e.g.,  results by  Mathios  and  Ippolito  (1999).  The  authors  test  whether 
regulatory changes in the mid ‘80s in the US – which allowed producers to link diet to disease 
risk in advertising and labelling – resulted in improved consumers’ food choices (i.e., more   23 
cases  reflect  governments’  support; as in China,  where  Public Authorities  work  to 
fulfil a self-sufficiency food policy (McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003). This compels us 
to consider the arguments put forward to increase public acceptance of GMOs. Pro-
biotech parties usually try to gain support for GMOs by emphasizing that their use 
contributes both to enhance environmental quality and to increase food availability, so 
reducing  the  world  hunger
11.  But  these  arguments  tend  to  overcome  consumers’ 
diffidence  by  proposing  that  comprehensible  cautiousness  be  traded-off  with  the 
potential gains accruing from full exploitation of modern technology. Apart from not 
being entirely clear why pro bio-tech parties should be interested either in reducing the 
world hunger or in contributing to preserve the environment, there might be reasons to 
argue that the alleged beneficial effects deriving from the diffusion of biotech food are 
regarded by consumers as second-order with respect to their primary concern, that is 
their health. 
How should then the decision between two paternalistic policies, one aimed at 
informing consumers and the other aimed at helping consumers to avoid confusion, be 
made?  Our  results  put  forward  that  information  on  GMOs  matters,  and  negative 
information matters more than positive information (which suggests that consumers’ 
are  risk-averse);  hence  –  having  decided  to  market  these  products  –  governments 
                                                                                                                                  
information is better) or, on the contrary, confused consumers slowing improvements in diet 
that  would  otherwise  occur  (i.e.,  more  information  is  worst).  Results  suggest  there  is  no 
evidence in support of the “confusion hypothesis”. On the contrary, more healthful product 
innovations emerged from the competition of producers on health. 
11 See, for example, the website of the Council for Biotechnology information, a non-profit  
organization  that  communicates  science-based  information  about the  benefits  and  safety  of 
agricultural  biotechnology  and  its  contribution  to  sustainable  development,  
http://www.whybiotech.com/.   24 
should impose mandatory labels
12. GM foods are practically indistinguishable from 
their  non  genetically  modified  counterparts.  Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  labelling 
information,  no  chance  is  given  to  consumers  to  identify  them.  Labels  involve 
substantial costs for the biotech and the food industries, basically connected to the need 
of maintaining a segregation system (e.g., Buckwell et al., 1999; Wilson and Dahl, 
2005). From this point of view, even if there were no doubts that GMOs are safe for 
public health, labelling would be beneficial to consumers, because it would allow them 
to  properly  identify  different  products
13.  Clearly,  this  benefits  should  be  weighted 
against costs. But labelling (and benefits for consumers) is even more important here, 
given, as discussed before, uncertainty on several important aspects concerning GMOs.  
Second,  our  findings  indicate  that  not  all  information  has  an  equal  value  to 
consumers; these trust particularly what they believe are unbiased information sources, 
like their GPs. This result indicate that the crucial issue is not the presence of the label 
per se, but the availability of the necessary information to make good use of the label 
to assess potential health risks. In the light of this result, the problem for producers 
should  not  be  to  lobby  in  order  to  obtain  a  non  mandatory  label,  but  to  remove 
uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding GM foods. Our results suggest that this can 
be  achieved  by  properly  informing  (and  convincing)  GPs  and  other  health 
                                                 
12 In Europe, actual legislation dictates that food and feed must carry a label if they contain (or 
are produced from) GMOs in a proportion higher than 0.9 %.  
13 Not surprisingly, labels are used to inform consumers about different production techinques, 
involving organic farming or exclusion of GMOs.   25 
professionals that risks for human health are minimal
14. The fact that producers of GM 
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Appendix B – Decision Sheets 
 
   
 





































Suppose you are endowed with 5 €. How much are 








Suppose you are endowed with 5 €. How much are 
you willing to pay to get the product displayed 
above? 
 
Net WT: 1 liter  
Ingredients: orange juice  
Contains GMOs 
 
Net WT: 1 liter  
Ingredients: orange juice  
No GMOs 
   31 
       FIGURE B3. Decision sheet in S3  





















        FIGURE B4. Decision sheet in S3 
        (Group B – Negative information). 
 
            






















Suppose you are endowed with 5 €. How much are 




Net WT: 1 liter  
Ingredients: orange juice  
Contains GMOs 
 
The newscast gave the following news: the 
use of GMOs increases crops and helps in 










Suppose you are endowed with 5 €. How much are 




Net WT: 1 liter  
  Ingredients: orange juice  
Contains GMOs 
 
The newscast gave the following news: the 
use of GMOs causes immune reactions and  
increases the percentage of allergic people 
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FIGURE B5. Decision sheet in S4.   






















Information – GPs 
 
Genetically  modified  proteins  are  very  injurious.  After  having  consumed 
genetically  modified  food,  we  can  keep  on  living  with  genetically  modified 
proteins for long time because they continuously replicate in our body. Doctors 
report increasing digestive problems among their patients during the last ten 
years. 
 
Information – Greenpeace 
 
Plants  and  animals  become  a  sort  of  “living”  genetic  pollution  that  shifts, 
reproduces itself and interacts with the surrounding environment. If something 














Suppose you are endowed with 5 €. How much are 




Net WT: 1 liter  
  Ingredients: orange juice  
Contains GMOs 
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Information – IlSole24ore (October 2007, the 28th) 
 
Vegetables  are  more  and  more  attacked  by  new  viruses  and  parasites.  The 
recombined techniques of the DNA allow us to save them: actually, GMO food 
is more ecologic.  
 
Information – Scientists 
 
Is  biotech  food  safe  for  human  being?  Yes,  until  the  opposite  is  proved. 
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1. Age:   
 
2. Gender:    Male         Female 
 
3. How often do you do shopping?    Never       Once a month      Twice a month     
   More than twice a month    
 
4. If you did not answer “never” to the previous question: do you check whether the 
product you buy contains GMOs?   Yes       No 
 
5. Do you usually buy orange juice?   Yes       No 
 
6. Is this the first time you have heard of genetically modified food?   Yes      No 
 
7. If you answered “yes” to the previous question, could you tell us if you are  either: 
  in favour of GMOs      against GMOs 
 
8. Do you live out of Turin?     Yes      No 
 
9)If you have answered “yes” to the previous question: how do you usually come to 
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Appendix D - Tables and Figures 
 














Variable  Definition  Mean  St.dev.  Min  Max 
Male  1 = male  0.49  0.5     
Age  participant's age  22.8  4.83  20  54 
Supermarket  1 = participants who regularly go to the supermarket  0.12  0.33     
Control  1 = participant controls the label before buying a product  0.39  0.49     
Juice  1 = participant regularly consumes orange juice  0.58  0.49     
Pro-GMOs  1 = participant is pro GMOs (only 20 subjects answered)  0.15  0.37     
First  1 = participant know what GMOs are  All but one knew what GMOs means         36 
 



















    Average  valuation in 
S1 
Average  valuation  
in S2 
       
M (N = 51)    1.57  0.88 
F (N = 54)    1.36  0.71 
Mann-Whitney test    p = 0.28  p = 0.35 
       
Juice (N = 13)    1.49  0.79 
      ┐Juice (N = 91)    1.43  0.77 
Mann-Whitney test    p = 0.10  p = 0.35 
       
Control (N = 41)    1.40  0.65 
┐Control (N = 63)    1.50  0.86 
Mann-Whitney test    p = 0.45  p = 0.064 
       
       
Supermarket 
 (N = 13) 
  1.45  0.93 
┐ Supermarket 
(N = 91) 
  1.46  0.76 
Mann-Whitney test    p = 0.8  p = 0.13   37 
                   
TABLE 3. Average valuation (S2 and S3) by quality of information received, either 
negative (INFO1_NEG) or positive (INFO1_POS). 
 
  Average valuation in 
S2 
Average valuation in 
S3 
Wilcoxon test  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
INFO1_NEG 
 (N = 51) 
0.83  0.40  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
INFO1_POS 
 (N = 54) 
0.73  0.98  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
Mann-Whitney test  p = 0.564         38 
 
TABLE 4. Average valuation  (S2 and S3) by sex and quality of the information 






















    Average 
valuation in S2 
(1) 
Average 





between S3 and 
S2 
(2) – (1) 
Wilcoxon 
test 
  INFO1_ 
NEG 
       
Male (N = 14)    1.15  0.63  -0.52  p = 0.0024 
Female (N = 30)    0.72  0.31  -0.41  p = 0.000 
Mann –  
Whitney test 
      p = 0.334   
           
           
  INFO1_ 
POS 
       
Male (N = 37)    0.75  0.87  0.12  p = 0.0055 
Female (N = 24)    0.71  1.14  0.43  p = 0.0003 
Mann –  
Whitney test 
      p = 0.013     39 
TABLE 5. Distribution of the choices concerning the information source 








                                              
 
 
                                            
 
  M  F  TOT 
Physicians  18  35  53 
Scientists  19  11  30 
Other  14  8  22 
       
TOT  54  51  105 
Chi2    p = 0.01     40 
TABLE 6. Average valuation (S1-S4) by quality of information received in S3 (either 
positive or negative) and choice of the information source in S4.  
 








in S3 (1) 
Average 




(1) = (2) 
INFO1_NEG_DOC 
 (N = 28) 
1.42  0.87  0.4  0.13  p = 
0.0007 
INFO1_NEG_SC  
(N = 10) 
1.29  0.84  0.58  0.66  p = 
0.5653 
INFO1_NEG_GREEN  
(N = 5) 
1.32  0.61  0.04  0.14  - 
INFO1_NEG_NEWS  
(N = 3) 
2  0.83  0.4  0.37  - 
INFO1_POS_DOC 
 (N = 25) 
1.43  0.82  1.17  0.48  p = 
0.000 
INFO1_POS_SC  
(N = 20) 
1.45  0.74  0.88  0.94  p = 0.12 
INFO1_POS_GREEN  
(N = 11) 
1.67  0.41  0.45  0.34  p = 0.12 
INFO1_POS_NEWS  
(N = 6) 
1.6  0.93  1.47  1.62  -   41 
 




R1. OLS Regression. Dependent variable: Average evaluation S3i –  Average evaluation S2i 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
**   significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
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age  -  -  .009 
(.01) 

































-  - .119  
(.172) 
- 
       
N  108  104  104 
F  27.76***  6.3***  6.9*** 
R
2  .3437  .4014  .3971   42 
 




























Standard errors in parentheses 
*   significance at 10% 
*** significance at 1% 
 
  DOC  SC 




INFO1_POSi  -.573  
(.745) 
-.808   
(.809) 

























     
N   104  104 
rho  -1*** 
Wald chi2  50.7*** 
     